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POVERTY LAW AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM:
NOTES FROM A LAW SCHOOL CLINIC
STEPHEN LOFFREDO'
INTRODUCTION
During the heyday of anti-poverty activism in the 1960s, scholars,
lawyers and community organizers recognized that law reform might
play an important catalytic role in promoting movements for social
change. This insight helped fuel the creation of organizations whose
very names (e.g., "Mobilization for Youth," or "MFY Legal Services")
reflected the goal of cultivating community activism.' Later efforts to
institutionalize legal support-including Ed Sparer's work with the
Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law-further drew upon the po-
tential synergies between lawyers pursuing legal reforms and activists
building grassroots welfare rights . Many commentators
'Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. A draft of
this paper was delivered at the 20th Annual Edward V. Sparer Symposium, "Social
Movements and Law Reform," at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on March
2, 2001. 1 thank Helen Hershkoff for her valuable comments and suggestions.
I See LARRY R. JACKSON & WILLIAM A. JOHNSON, PROTEST BY THE POOR: THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN NEWYORK CI'Y 53-60 (1974) (charting the progression
of Mobilization for Youth from an organization dedicated to combating juvenile delin-
quency to an activist organization involved in a broad array of social movements);
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS
OF PUBLIC WELFARE 290-95 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the establishment and subse-
quent activities of Mobilization for Youth).
2 For a history of the period, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND
THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 81-95 (1993), describing the litigation
campaign that established due process rights for welfare recipients whose assistance
grants were terminated by the government; and ARYEH NEIER, ONLYJUDGMENT: THE
LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 127-40 (1982), describing the law reform
campaign to secure adequate welfare assistance. See also Rand E. Rosenblatt, Legal Enti-
tlements and Welfare Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 262, 262 (David Kairys ed., 1982)
(noting that in the 1960s there was a "belief that law could and should play a major
role in changing relationships of highly unequal power"); Jonathan Zasloff, Children,
Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14J.L. & POL. 225, 268-69 (1998)
(describing the Office of Economic Opportunity and its establishment of local com-
munity action boards with the requirement of "'maximum feasible participation' of
low-income people themselves," and the parallel creation of "the legal services agen-
cies that quickly became adept at bringing class action lawsuits challenging the admini-
stration of and eligibility standards for [Aid to Families with Dependent Children]").
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have since analyzed these interactions between poverty lawyers and
the welfare fights movement, and have questioned whether the col-
laboration produced meaningful and sustainable change.3 At least
some of the literature credits the lawyers' court-centered campaign for
welfare rights4 with improving the material circumstances of large
numbers of poor people and precipitating reform of state and federal
programs and institutions.' Likewise, social scientists have examined
the impact that the social mobilizations had during this period in lib-
eralizing the welfare system and generating broader attitudinal
changes toward the poor." Commentators voice a cautionary note,
however, criticizing what they perceive as a lack of a consistent, or-
ganic connection between the lawyers' judicial strategies and the pri-
orities of the welfare movement itself.7 They express concern that
poverty lawyers approached their clients in instrumental terms," and
3 SeeJOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 155-162 (1978) (offering illustrative social welfare
case studies that combined litigation with mobilization). Compare Edward V. Sparer,
Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 561 (1984) (emphasizing the
importance of rights-based strategies to broader movements for social change), with
William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431,
1432 (1986) (criticizing the reformist emphasis on rights as impeding broader efforts
for social change).
4 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that due process
protections attach to welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)
(holding that states may not withhold welfare benefits in ways that "penalize" the exer-
cise of constitutional rights); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325-27 (1968) (establishing
entitlement status of federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) bene-
fits and limiting state authority to deny assistance).
See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MiCiH. L. REV.
1401, 1432 (1995) (reviewing MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993)) (referring to the legal reforms achieved by fed-
eral welfare litigators in the 1960s as "no small accomplishment"); cf R. SHEP MELNICK,
BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 206-31 (1994) (discussing the
impact of later litigation efforts involving the food stamp program).
6 Compare Robert B. Albritton, Social Amelioration Through Mass Insurgency? A Reex-
amination of the Piven and Cloward Thesis, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1003, 1005-10 (1979)
(using empirical evidence to question the mobilization theory), with Sanford F.
Schram & J. Patrick Turbett, Civil Disorder and the Welfare Explosion: A Two-Step Process,
48 AM. Soc. REV. 408, 410-13 (1983) (using empirical evidence to support the mobili-
zation theory).
7 See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Cli-
ents to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 535 (1987-88) (observing that
"[t]he individuals who served as named plaintiffs in these lawsuits sometimes had little
contact with their lawyers or involvement in the lawsuit after the complaint was filed
and their depositions recorded").
See Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lauryering, and Street-Level Bu-
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argue, more broadly, that a legal campaign to achieve fundamental
social change-such as a constitutional right to a decent income-is• 9
bound to fail without a politically effective social movement.
The number of lawyers engaged in legal work for the poor has de-
clined over the last two decades,' ° and the dominant political culture
structurally and affirmatively discourages civic participation and activ-
ism by poor people." Yet, heartening countercurrents persist.'2  At
least some commentators believe that a "new poverty law movement"
is in process, 3 involving a growing number of practitioners and schol-
reaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 953 (1992) (enlisting Gerald Lopez's concept of reg-
nant lawyering to criticize traditional poverty law practice as being "client-centered, but
in an instrumental way; it seeks to improve the lot of the disadvantaged by increasing
their access to rights and to institutionally defined remedies"); cf Paul L. Tractenberg,
Using Law to Advance the Public Interest: Rutgers Law School and Me, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
1001, 1004 (1999) (positing that public interest lawyers, taking an instrumental ap-
proach, "typically identify the interest to be advanced before the client appears, and
the client becomes the vehicle for advancing that interest").
9 See Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 4 (1984-85) (contending that "[o]rganized masses of people, not lawyers,
play the critical roles" in movements for social change).10 See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., TWENTY-FIFrH ANNIVERSARY ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1998-
99) ("Notwithstanding outside funding, by 1990, almost 2,000 fewer legal services at-
torneys served low-income Americans than in 1981 .... ); Greg Winter, Legal Firms
Cutting Back on Free Services to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2000, at Al ("The roughly
50,000 lawyers at the nation's 100 highest-grossing firms spent an average ofjust eight
minutes a day on pro bono cases in 1999... [or] about 36 hours a year, down signifi-
cantly from 56 hours in 1992 ...."). In addition, federal funding for legal services has
declined significantly and Congress has imposed sweeping restrictions on the activities
of legal services lawyers. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043, 1046
(2001) ("[The restriction] prohibits legal representation funded by recipients of LSC
moneys if the representation involves an effort to amend or otherwise challenge exist-
ing welfare law.); The Comm. on Civil Rights & The Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility of
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., A Call for Repeal or Invalidation of Restrictions of Legal
Services Lawyers, 53 REC. 15, 16-19 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) (noting a 14.6% reduction in open
cases of the Legal Services Corporation nationally from 1995 to 1997).
1 To take but one highly visible example, Congress has prohibited any political
activity, or facilitation of such activity, by lawyers for the poor who work in offices that
receive any federal funds. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 504(a) (1996) (barring attorneys
employed by a law office that receives any federal Legal Services Corporation ("LSC")
funds from engaging in legislative advocacy, administrative advocacy or organizing, or
facilitating or encouraging client participation in those activities).
12 See Frances Fox Piven, Welfare Movement Rises, NATION, May 8, 2000, at 4, 5 ("Be-
low the radar screen of press and politicians, scores of grassroots groups are waging
fights at the local and state level to expose the realities of welfare reform and the low-
wage labor market .... There are signs that these local efforts are coalescing into a na-
tional movement ....' ).
13 See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard, Mobilizing Law Schools in Re-
sponse to Povrty: A Report on Experiments in Progress, 43J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 201 (1993)
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ars discussing, among other topics, how lawyers for subordinated
groups can work with a broader community to precipitate progressive
change. Talking variously about facilitating client empowerment,14
about advancing economic justice," and about "resist[ing] systemic
subordination,"' " the participants in this movement seek to construct
practices that reshape the substance and processes of legal advocacy to
support community-based activism and promote a substantive version• • 17
of socialjustice.
This Article examines a collaboration between a grassroots welfare
rights organization, the Welfare Rights Initiative (WRI), and a law
school clinic that I direct at the City University of New York School of
Law (CUNY). Both WRI and the CUNY clinic came into being in re-
sponse to draconian welfare policies imposed by New York City in the
mid-1990s-policies that, among other unfortunate consequences,
("By challenging the efficacy of social change strategies that separate the assertion of
legal rights from inquiries about the role and effect of the legal system, the new pov-
erty law movement is reconceptualizing, rather than abandoning, the project of using
law to create social change."); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory
and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICiH. L. REv. 821, 828
(1997) (discussing how to bridge the gap between progressive race theory and political
lawyering practice in order to promote economic justice).
14 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Or-
ganizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443, 460 (2001) (discussing "a practical vision of how law-
yers could achieve social change through community organizing" that empowers cli-
ents and effects systemic reform).
15 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995)
(describing development of an advocacy organization dedicated to securing economic
rights for low-wage immigrant workers, and analyzing the conflicts it encountered in
trying to shape its legal clinic to serve a grassroots organizing strategy).
Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 746 n.176; see also id. at 742 ("Instead of pushing a com-
munity into a lawsuit, the lawyer should help his clients understand the limits of litiga-
tion and challenge them to develop creative, rather than reactive, litigation strate-gies.").
7 See, e.g., Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood,
32 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 67, 68 (2000) (urging poverty lawyers to become "more
active in organizing and developing client groups"); Richard D. Marsico, Working for
Social Change & Preserving Client Autonomy. Is There a Role for "Facilitative" Lawyering?, I
CLINICAL L. REv. 639 (1994); Ann Southworth, Business Planning for the Destitute? Law-
yers as Facilitators in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 1121, 1147 (de-
scribing the facilitative role of poverty lawyers with respect to community develop-
ment); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 157 (1994) (addressing how professionally
trained lawyers can participate in the new field of collaborative lawyering and work to
cause social change at the grassroots level); Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversa-
tions on Progressive Social Change, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 285, 285-86 (1996) (de-
scribing versions of a concept of political lawyering).
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forced thousands of welfare mothers to drop out of the City University
of New York and abandon their pursuit of a college degree. Over the
past several years, this joint venture has provided rights education and
legal representation to large numbers of individuals, organized grass-
roots pressure for more humane social welfare policies, and sought,
with some success, legislative reforms at the state and local levels.
I present this collaboration as a case study of a purposefully struc-
tured, mutually reinforcing interaction between legal advocacy, law
reform, and grassroots activism in the poverty context. What emerges
from this localized experience is a fluid, multidirectional relationship
between social mobilization and law reform, in which each activity can
catalyze and in turn be amplified by the other. The WRI activists, the
clinic interns, and the individual clients collaborated not solely
through case-specific advocacy, but also through group-based transac-
tional approaches, and in ways that reconfigure and redefine the tra-
ditional hierarchy of lawyer-client relations. I do not suggest that
these very particular and contingent experiences support any firm
claims or overarching conclusions. The more modest hope is that this
case study might contribute incrementally to the knowledge base of
social justice practitioners and help illuminate the relationship be-
tween law reform and social activism."'
Part I situates the case study in the broader context of the "new
poverty law" and emerging strategies for the design of collaborative
lawyer-client relations that can facilitate and support broader move-
ments for social change. Part II provides a partial account of the so-
cial context and "welfare reform" policies that gave rise to the WRI-
clinic alliance. Part III presents the case study, describing the estab-
lishment of the partnership and the theoretical justifications for the
relationship that we sought to generate; the work that we undertook;
and the reform that we precipitated, including the indirect effects that
the work triggered. Part IVjoins the case study with the themes of this
Symposium, asking whether prevailing theories of social movement
might provide a deeper understanding of this collaboration or similar
efforts to realize synergies between social mobilization and law reform
18 For a collection of "innovative practices," see LOUISE G. TRUBEK & JENNIFERJ.
FARNHAM, How To CREATE AND SUSTAIN A SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL JUSTICE COLLABO-
RATIVE: INNOVATIVE PRACTICES To EMPOWER PEOPLE OF Low AND MODERATE
INCOME-A GUIDEBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS (n.d.). See generally Louise G.
Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinay Practices for
People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227 (2000) (discussing how multidisciplinary practices can
achieve social change).
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in the context of economic justice.
I. THE NEW POVERTY LAW MOVEMENT
During the "War on Poverty" of the 1960s, Ed Sparer and others
combined social activism and legal work to create a new form of prac-
tice now known through the shorthand "poverty law.""' The idea was
that lawyers for the poor should transcend the customary legal aid
model of providing only traditional representation in a series of unre-
lated, individual, private-law disputes, and instead take on the task of
securing systemic and institutional changes that would alleviate pov-
erty itself. The innovative work of this period generated a vibrant po-
litical discussion about the propriety of this new role, and how poverty
lawyers could best contribute to the social transformations they viewed
as essential. At the Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law and MFY
Legal Services,. poverty lawyers worked toward their goal through an
ambitious litigation strategy that sought, with many intermediate
steps, to establish what Sparer called a "right to live"-a federal consti-
tutional right to economic support.2' But Sparer emphasized that liti-
gation alone could not achieve fundamental social change; legal
strategies had to be coupled with grassroots political strategies. The
19 See Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impover-
ished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 639, 644 (1994) (observing that in the 1960s
"[l]egal services were viewed not only as a social service outreach effort but also as a
mobilizing force for social change"); Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and
Difference in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 999, 1010 (1994) ("While the
notion of legal aid for the poor has been around almost as long as the legal profession,
the decade of the 1960s marked a period of substantial invigoration and of the flour-
ishin of efforts to use law to transform society on behalf of the disadvantaged.").
See DAvIS, supra note 2, at 28-32 (describing Ed Sparer's development of a new
model of poverty law at the MFY Legal Unit, a model that rejected "piecemeal direct
legal services in the Legal Aid tradition" in favor of "targeted study and direct litigation
designed to change the institutional structure that created and sustained poverty");
Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970) ("The
properjob for a poor people's lawyer is helping poor people to organize themselves to
change things so that either no one is poor or (less radically) so that poverty does not
entail misery.").
21 See Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT
THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65, 65-83 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971) (discussing
the struggle to establish a legal right to an adequate income); see also Helen Hershkoff
& David Hollander, Rights into Action: Public Interest Litigation in the United States, in
MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE 89, 91 (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000) (de-
scribing the establishment of the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law in 1965);
Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L. REV.
805, 819 (1990) (referring to Sparer as "the intellectual architect of the legal strategy
of the welfare rights movement").
[Vol. 150:173
POVERTY LA WAND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM
two endeavors might be designed to be mutually reinforcing: law re-
form efforts might activate movements for social change, and those
movements, in turn, might lay the groundwork-or create the political
atmosphere or public support-necessary for further progress through
22the courts or the legislatures. As Sparer later wrote, the role of the
poverty lawyer was to help "develop ... a constituency which will de-
cide for itself., 23 This approach did not require lawyers to be organiz-
ers, but it did mean that lawyers would work closely with organizers in
groups that afforded welfare recipients and the poor a public space
within which to make strategic decisions based on their own experi-
ences and perceived sense of need. Sparer emphasized that the cen-
tral role of poverty lawyers should be to help build a welfare rights
movement and to put themselves "at the service of [the movement]-
so as to help it become a more forceful part of American politics.
' '24
Current discussions about the relationship between social move-
ments and law reform take place in a less optimistic context than that
of the 1960s.2 By the 1970s, the Supreme Court had definitively
placed positive rights outside the domain of federal constitutional
law, 6 rejecting not only a narrow welfarist conception of minimum en-
titlements, 27 but also the broader idea that the Constitution embraces
See Diller, supra note 5, at 1411 ("By 1971, Sparer was arguing that 'the first step
in a grand strategy for lawyers in advancing welfare rights is to serve, and thereby help
build, an independent rights movement."' (quoting Sparer, supra note 21, at 88)); cf
NEIER, supra note 2, at 140 ("The Supreme Court could take on the enormous task of
ending legal segregation .... But the Court would not and could not establish [] for
the poor a right to live... [because] the claim by the poor that they had a right to sub-
sistence seemed to most Americans to lack morality.").
23 Sparer, supra note 21, at 87.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 287, 290 (1996) ("The present moment is a tough one for political lawyers,
whether they have been at work for twenty or thirty years or are recent or prospective
law school graduates.").
26 Liberal scholars likewise now tend to locate affirmative rights outside the do-
main of enforceable constitutional rights, even as a normative goal. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 155 (1993) (contending that "the right to wel-
fare, if it exists at all, is a good candidate for membership in the class of judicially un-
derenforced constitutional principles"); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Re-
flections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 420 (1993)
(describing the institutional difficulties of having courts enforce welfare rights). But
see Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rational-
ity Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131 (1999) (questioning the view that courts lack capac-
ity to resolve social and economic concerns affecting the poor).
27 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 & n.20 (1980) (finding no right to gov-
ernment assistance to facilitate the reproductive choices of indigent women); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (rejecting a federal constitutional guarantee of
2001]
180 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
a right of social citizenship. Moreover, by applying only the most
feeble and deferential form of rationality review to laws affecting the
poor, the Court allowed state and federal welfare programs to func-
tion as instruments of subordination that debased and stigmatized the
poor and served to perpetuate inequality and indignity.2V' As poverty
became more entrenched, liberal scholars voiced an increasing lack of
faith in the idea that law-at least in its judicialized form-could
meaningfully resolve problems of inequality and deprivation. Mean-
while, the Legal Services Corporation, changing ideological course,
explicitly renounced the goal of "achieving social change., 3 ' And
minimum shelter); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (refusing to rec-
ognize a right to public welfare assistance under the Fourteenth Amendment).
28 See William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1773-74
(1994) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 26 (distinguishing between "a court-centered
conception of posifiv6 rights as being solely for the poor" and "the broader conception
of equal citizenship")); see alsoJoel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The
Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 899, 904 (1990) ("Reconstructing the welfare relationship in terms of
entitlements has either undermined citizenship social rights ... or affirmed the obliga-
tions of citizenship .... ); Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403, 1428 (1999) (describing state constitutional narratives of
social citizenship that contrast with the federal account).
29 See generally Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1277 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme Court's application of rationality re-
view to sustain legislation disadvantaging poor people and arguing that the political
marlinalization of the poor requires some form of enhanced judicial protection).
.o See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 157 (1991) (finding "little evidence that the judicial system, from the
Supreme Court down, produced much of the massive change in civil rights that swept
the United States in the 1960s"); Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law:
Abortion, Welfare and Constitutional Theory, 58 01110 ST. L.J. 731, 742-45 (1997) (observ-
ing that many liberal constitutional theorists have abandoned arguments for a judi-
cially enforceable constitutional right to subsistence); see also Joel F. Handler, Dependent
People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 999, 1000 (1988) (acknowledging "the realization of the limits of the legal rights
revolution in protecting dependent people"); Stuart Scheingold, Constitutional Rights
and Social Change: Civil Rights in Perspective, inJUDGING THE CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 73, 80 (Michael W. McCann ed., 1989) ("[C]ourts
have sufficient power to politicize-to provoke a crisis-but not to effect social change
on their own."). See generally Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Thal Courts: Lawyers, Poli-
cymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 899 (1998) ("Rosenberg's
(1991) important book reopened and extended an argument begun by Dahl in 1957.
Dahl argued that the Supreme Court did not make national politics independently,
but, instead, only acted within a shared national alliance of the president and Con-
gress.").
31 Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor?, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 745, 758 & n.100 (1992) (citing Alan W. Houseman, Community Group Ac-
tion: Legal Services, Poor People and Community Groups, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 392, 396
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commentators increasingly questioned the entire premise of the law
reform enterprise, suggesting that a law-based strategy may be "ill
suited to the poverty law context because it puts lawyers-whose
knowledge of the issues facing poor clients is at best second-hand-at
the center of power and decision making in the movement.- 2
Poverty lawyers began to reflect self-critically on whether they
could play any legitimate role in the struggles that poor people face,'
considering whether they would do best by helping "people subordi-
nated by political and social life [to] learn to recognize and value and
extend their own problem-solving know-how.,3 4 At least some of this
second-generation discussion proceeded on pessimistic terms that,
ironically, placed the lawyer center-stage in the underlying narrative. 5
In the last decade, however, activists and scholars have begun the
hard, constructive project of devising forms of poverty law practice
that will allow poverty lawyers to collaborate with individual clients
and communities within less dominant and hierarchical structures.%
The discussions build on a shared insight that accepts a more modest
account of law's transformative power,37 but also draws on a constitu-
tive theory of law. The new poverty lawyers thus emphasize the need
(1985)).
32 DAVIS, supra note 2, at 143. Moreover, this model, Davis suggested, "tends... to
undermine the often fragile organizing power of the grass-roots movement." ld.See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 LAW & POL'Y 5, 9
(1985) (urging that "legal means of resolving problems should be avoided whenever
possible, for they tend to reinforce the client's experience of powerlessness").
34 GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-
GRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 70 (1992).
.5 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 695 (1987-1988) (arguing that
"[t] he attorney/client relation stands at the epicenter of th[e] marginalization [of the
poor] ").
36 See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer Out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 213, 221 (1993) (questioning the view that "lawyers [for the poor] have rela-
tively little that is distinctive to offer clients").
For helpful, if critical, discussions of the causal approach to law and social
movements, see Malcolm M. Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and
Notes on an Expanded View, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 497 (1976); and Michael McCann,
Causal Versus Constitutive Explanations (Or, On the Difficulty of Being So Positive.. .), 21
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 457 (1996).
38 See generally Austin Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990) (observing the omni-
presence of legal rules and practices in the lives of welfare recipients). Paul Kahn fur-
ther explains, "[t] he rule of law shapes our experience of meaning everywhere and at
all times. It is not alone in shaping meaning, but it is rarely absent." PAUL W. KAHN,
THE CULTURAL. STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 124 (1999).
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to "seek[] to realize collaborative aspirations in everyday institutional
settings,, 39 so that lawyers maintain in their relations with clients a dy-
namic that "enrich[es] and extend[s] the range of possible strategies
and outcomes they might cooperatively pursue."4 0 Commentators of-
fer visions of practice that vary considerably in the emphasis placed on
law's comparative advantage relative to other strategic methodologies,
on the need for organizational structure, and on the efficacy of court-
centered activity. But these visions share a recognition of the bonds
thatjoin client and lawyer together in a common enterprise.4
II. WELFARE, WORK, AND WORKFARE
The social and political context for poverty law and poor peoples'
41
mobilizations has shifted dramatically over the past thirty-five years.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a wholesale transformation of the War
on Poverty into what sociologist Herbert Gans aptly describes as a War
on the Poor, with blame for economic distress placed on individual
deficiency rather than structural conditions.43 Even before Congress
"ended welfare as we know it" in 1996, states had begun to imposeS• 44
punitive restrictions on relief recipients. In the process, welfare
payments in real terms plummeted to their lowest levels for decades,
39 White, supra note 17, at 159.
40 LOPEZ, supra note 34, at 51.
41 See, e.g., Richard E. Blum, To Peter Cicchino, from the Heart, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 19, 20 (2001) (explaining that the work of lawyers for the homeless "is
grounded in simple human decency, in caring for our fellow human beings, and dare I
say it, even love").
42 See Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New Agenda for Poverty Law-
yers, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 547 (1998) ("The legal landscape confront-
ing public interest lawyers for the poor in 1999 is quite different from the landscape of
1969.").
43 See HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 82-85 (1995) (discussing political backlash against the poor in
the 1980s and 1990s and the use of myth and stereotype in public and political dis-
course to scapegoat poor people and justify punitive social welfare policies); see also
Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 284
("The category of underclass is defined not only by the perception that its designated
members are the chronically poor, but also by the belief that their poverty results from
their own failings.").
44 See Stephen Loffredo, "If You Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi": The Commerce Clause and
State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 148, 169-73 (1993)
(discussing political assaults on welfare programs and recipients, and state imposition
of cutbacks and punitive eligibility restrictions in the early 1990s).
45 See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW AND POLIC, WELFARE MYrHs: FACT OR
FICTION? EXPLORING THE TRUTH ABOUT WELFARE 13 (1996) (documenting the de-
clining real value of AFDC and food stamp benefits between 1975 and 1994).
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and the income gap between the richest and poorest grew to its wid-
est." ' Then, in 1996, Congress abolished the half-century-old Aid to
47Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program, thus elimi-
nating any federal safety net for indigent families and their children.
The 1996 Act was said to reflect a consensus that the legal regime of
entitlement, a fixed feature of welfare policy since the 1960s, could no
longer be sustained.48
Deploying the rhetoric of personal responsibility, self-sufficiency
and independence, the 1996 Act proceeded on a theory that recipi-
ents of governmental assistance must accept a "reciprocal set of obli-
gations" with the broader society.49 Hence, a critical element of fed-
4; See Steven A. Holmes, Income Disparity Between Poorest and Richest Rises, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1996, at Al (describing a U.S. Census Bureau report indicating "a pro-
nounced increase in the gap between the incomes of the well-to-do and those of the
poor and the working class"); see also Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the Personal
Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare as We Know It or Governmental Child Abuse?, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 368-71 (1998) (reporting that in 1994, 36.4 million Ameri-
cans lived in poverty, and that "the percentage of Americans working full time but
earning less than the poverty level for a family of four rose by 50% in the thirteen year
period between 1981 and 1994").
47 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-1788 (Supp. V 1999)) (eliminat-
ing the federal statutory entitlement to welfare created when the AFDC program was
enacted on Aug. 14, 1935). Seegenerally HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE
RIGHTS OF THE POOR (1997) (discussing welfare rights and entitlements under the
AFDC and after its repeal).
48 The United States, unlike other advanced industrial nations, has never recog-
nized an unconditional entitlement to basic subsistence benefits as a matter of right or
need. See Handler, supra note 28, at 967 ("In Europe citizenship included a universal
right to a real income not proportionate to the market value of the claimant... . [In
the United States, the effort to] creat[e] entitlement-based social rights for the poor in
the form of a decent income maintenance system ... [has] stalled."). Instead, a
patchwork of categorical welfare programs coexisted uneasily within a framework that
based assistance on a number of conditions aimed at identifying the so-called "deserv-
ing" poor who for reasons of disability or other "worthy" characteristics, would be ex-
cused for their inability to support themselves. SeeJoel F. Handler, The Transformation
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 459 (1987-88) (describing segmentation of social
welfare programs in the United States).
49 See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OB-
LIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986) (advancing the reciprocity thesis and urging imposi-
tion of strict work requirements on public assistance recipients). For critiques of the
reciprocal obligations theory embodied in current welfare reform measures, see Kath-
ryn R. Lang, Fair Work, Not "Workfare".- Examining the Role of Subsidized Jobs in Fulfilling
States' Work Requirements Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of
1996, 25 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 959 (1998). See also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Na-
ture of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform, "36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 305 (1996) ("The
logic of workfare rests on the premise that the problems of the poor are the product of
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eral welfare reform was the imposition of strict "workfare" require-
ments on individuals receiving relief.
50
Workfare is not work in the classical sense. Although workfare
participants labor like any other worker-albeit under far less attrac-
tive terms and conditions of "employment"-neither the law nor soci-
ety accords workfare workers the status, dignity, or protection ac-
corded the regularly employed. Workfare is not recognized as a real
job: the recipient lacks the status of employee,2 does not receive the
minimum wage or regular workers' compensation coverage, 4 is not
their own choices and individual weakness and failures."); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871, 878 (1994) (emphasizing workfare's
devaluation of the work of Black mothers, which in turn perpetuates the devaluation of
Black children and Black mothering).
See Cynthia A. Bailey, Workfare and Involuntary Servitude-What You Wanted to
Know but Were Afraid to Ask, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285, 286 (1995) ("Workfare spe-
cifically refers to the idea that welfare recipients should be required to work for their
benefits."); Elspeth K. Deily, Working with Welfare: Can Single Mothers Manage?, 12
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 132 (1997) ("Marking a fundamental shift from the for-
mer system, the Welfare Act provides each state with a block grant and wide latitude in
determining to whom and how to provide welfare .... The linchpin to the new legisla-
tion is encouraging self-sufficiency through work requirements.").
See Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New Workfare,
9 STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 19, 27 (1998) (describing inferior legal protections and social
status accorded welfare workers).
See Vacim Mahmoudov, Are Workfare Participants "Employees?": Legal Issues Pre-
sented by a Two-Tiered Labor Force, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 349 (1998) (discussing cur-
rent legal treatment of workfare participants); MaryJ. O'Connell, Municipal Labor Per-
spectives on the Public Sector Welfare Workforce in New York City, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 805,
805 (1999) (noting that "[ciurrently, workfare recipients do not have the rights to or-
ganize and bargain collectively, but they may later"). But see Walter M. Luers, Note,
Workfare Wages Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 205 (1998)
(contending that "workfare participants are employees who are covered by" the mini-
mum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
See Noelle M. Reese, Workfare Participants Deserve Employment Protections Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and Workers' Compensation Laws, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 873, 878
(2000) (discussing the lack of employee status of workfare participants and recom-
mending change); see also KevinJ. Miller, Comment, Welfare and the Minimum Wage: Are
Workfare Participants "Employees" Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
183 (1999) (arguing that workfare participants should be considered employees and
should ordinarily qualify for the minimum wage). In 1997, the United States Depart-
ment of Labor announced its view that federal employment laws, including the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act, apply to welfare recipients. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, How
WORKPLACE LAws APPLY TO WELFARE RECIPIENTS (1997) ("Federal employment
laws. . . apply to welfare recipients as they apply to other workers. The new welfare law
does not exempt welfare recipients from the law."), available at
http://www.dol.gov/asp/w2w/welfare.htm. In practice, however, the Labor Depart-
ment's policy does not extend equal treatment to workfare workers because it allows
states to count food stamp benefits as "wages" that can satisfy minimum wage require-
ments. Id. Moreover, even this halfhearted attempt to afford a modicum of protection
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protected against occupational hazards,5 and is ineligible for Social
Security coverage, the earned income tax credit or unemployment
compensation benefits. 5' As Peter B. Edelman explains, "[w]orkfare is
simply putting people to work doing tasks that do not make them
more marketable, because it is unaccompanied by training, basic-skills
education, or assistance in finding a job."57 Proponents of workfare
argue that the program is intended to socialize welfare recipients to
the culture of work by cultivating habits and attitudes needed for wage
labor, thereby restoring dignity and self-sufficiency to the economi-
cally marginalized.8 Critics of workfare read a different message in
the program's coercive strictures, arguing that it will create a "work-
to workfare workers drew intense criticism from many state governors and members of
Congress, Diller, supra note 51, at 9, and is unlikely to find support in the Bush ad-
ministration.
54 See MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION § 106:64 (2000) (WESTLAW, MWC Li-
brary) (noting that workfare recipients "have been held not covered by workers' com-
pensation, and sometimes are specifically excluded by statute"). But see Kemp v. City of
Hornell, 672 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Div. 1988) (affirming a Workers' Compensation
Board decision that a county was a workfare recipient's general employer and the city
was his special employer, with liability for claims to be apportioned between the two
entities). See generally Joel M. Poch, Workfare-An Analysis of a Doomed Elixir, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Mar./Apr. 1997 at 42, 43-44 (collecting cases on the status of workfare recipients
under employment law).
55 See Gail Aska, Is Workfare Working? A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, 8J.L. & POL'Y 149, 149 (1999) (describing workfare expe-
riences of members of Community Voices Heard, an organization of workfare partici-
pants, who were "forced to work with the remains of dead animals with no proper cov-
ering on their hands or bodies"); see also Capers v. Giuliani, 677 N.Y.S.2d 353 (App.
Div. 1998) (dismissing state court complaint challenging denial of protective clothing
and equipment to workfare recipients for failure to exhaust administrative remedies),
appeal denied, 711 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1999).
56 See Diller, supra note 51, at 20 (arguing that workfare participants "receive none
of the benefits and potentially only a few of the legal protections of employment");
Brendan P. Lynch, Welfare Reform, Unemployment Compensation, and the Social Wager:
Dismantling Family Support Under Wisconsin's W-2 Workfare Plan, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 593, 612 (1998) (arguing that workfare recipients should be eligible for Wiscon-
sin unemployment compensation benefits if they "earn enough wages to qualify for
coverage under the requirements of previous employment applied to all [unemploy-
ment compensation claimants]").
57 Peter B. Edelman, Promoting Family by Promoting Work: The Hole in Martha Fine-
man's Doughnut, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 85, 95 (2000).
58 See Terence O'Neil, Workfare from a Management Perspective, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
813, 819 (1999) (discussing arguments in favor of workfare); Lauri Cohen, Comment,
Free Labor in the Name of Workfare: Na York's Reaction to the Brukhman v. Giuliani Deci-
sion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 711, 723 (1998) (quoting a New York City welfare administra-
tor who stated that workfare will "enable an increasingly large population of partici-
pants to achieve economic independence through permanent full-time employment").
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fare caste" tending to "debase" recipients," while displacing other low-
wage workers and driving wage rates down P0
In New York City, the Giuliani administration avidly embraced
workfare as a pillar of its social policy.' Like several states around the
nation,2 New York City established a substantial workfare program
even before the federal government's repeal of the AFDC and devolu-
63tion of block grant authority in 1996. The 1996 Act triggered an ex-
pansion of the city's workfare program,64 and further fueled its already
5) Diller, supra note 51, at 27-28.
60 See Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 360-363 (2000) ("Two years after the enactment of
welfare reform, both worker displacement and increased worker exploitation are al-
read' having an impact.").
See Mark Hoover, Is Workfare Working? A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, 8J.L. & POL'Y 129, 131 (1999) (the author, First
Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, declar-
ing that welfare as an "entitlement" has ended and praising the city's workfare pro-
gram as implementing a "mandatory reciprocal agreement... in which a beneficiary
receives benefits in return for work"); see also Nancy E. Hoffman, Workfare Implications
for the Public Sector, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 769, 769 (1999) ("New York State is a relative
pioneer in the implementation of workfare and [has] one of the largest welfare work
forces in the country.").
62 See, e.g., Dixie R. Switzer, Welfare Reform: Oregon's Response to the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 77 OR. L. REv. 759, 774-75 (1998) (discuss-
ing Oregon's workfare program as it existed prior to the repeal of the AFDC); Joanna
K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs and Poor Women, 26
NEW ENG. L. REv. 415, 442-45 (1991) (describing California as a leader in work and
training programs through its GAIN Act of 1985).
63 See Craig L. Briskin & Kimberly A. Thomas, The Waging of Welfare: All Work and
No Pay?, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 564 & n.25 (1998) (describing the process by
which states obtain waivers); Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare As We Know It'"-Wrong for
Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. FIGHTING POvERTY 3, 3 (1994) ("Many states under
waivers from the Reagan, Bush, and now the Clinton administrations, have instituted
work requirements (workfare) that an individual must satisfy in order to qualify for
welfare benefits."); see also Anthony Bertelli, Impoverished Liberalism: Does the New York
Workfare Program Violate Human Rights?, 5 BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 175 (1999) (examin-
ing the New York Work Experience Program established in anticipation of the 1996
welfare act). See generally Patricia A. Quigley, Protection of Existing Workers and the Imple-
mentation of "Workfar', 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 625 (1997) (analyzing the NewYork Work
Experience program).
64 Following the federal government's enactment of the Personal Responsibility
Act in 1996, New York State passed the Welfare Reform Act of 1997, 1997 N.Y. SESSION
LAws CH. 436, PT. B, § 148, which accords broad discretion to localities to administer
work and welfare programs. In 1995, New York City had already established the Work
Experience Program, described as "one of the toughest welfare-to-work programs in
the country." Catherine Ciarletta, Note, Choosing Between an Education and a Welfare
Check: An Examination of the New York City Workfare System, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153,
154 (2000). The Mayor's goal was to zero-out welfare by the year 2000; cf Neil Gilbert,
Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 327 (1996)
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aggressive campaign to purge needy families from the welfare rolls.
(Regrettably, no commensurate effort was made to lift these families
out of poverty or to address the city's staggering poverty rate, which
has not declined despite a decade of unprecedented prosperity.'6 )
The city's approach was both effectuated and symbolized by its plan to
convert income support centers-sites where the poor apply for food
stamps, Medicaid, and cash public assistance-into 'Job Centers" that
would implement workfare requirements, as well as a strict sanction
policy aimed at terminating benefits of any family deemed to have
committed even a trivial infraction of program rules."'
New York City's welfare-to-work scheme immediately ranked
among the most stringent in the nation. The city demanded that re-
cipients perform more hours of "work activity" than required by either
state or federal law.' 8 The city channeled a vastly larger proportion of
recipients into the most onerous "work activity"-workfare-than
other jurisdictions.69 It has refused to recognize certain educational
and training programs as "work activities," even though the federal
(observing that in anticipation of welfare block granting, New York Governor George
Pataki proposed "to reduce New York's AFDC grants by 26%").
65 In the late 1990s, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani went so far as to promise an absolute
end to all welfare receipt in New York City by the year 2000. The Mayor frequently re-
fers to the dramatic reduction in welfare caseloads as one of the signal achievements of
his administration. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 61, at 192 n.2 (quoting a 1998 speech
in which Mayor Giuliani extols the city's removal of "more than 400,000 from our wel-
fare rolls," and repeats his pledge to "take the unprecedented step of ending welfare
by the year 2000").
See NYC COALITION AGAINST HUNGER, POOR IN THE LAND OF DOLLARS:
HUNGER RISES AMID PROSPERITY 6-7 (2000) (documenting the dramatic increase in
hunger in New York City despite sustained economic growth); James Traub, Giuliani
Internalized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 62 ("[T]he City's poverty rate
of 22percent is just as bad as it was during the recession of the early 90's [sic].").
See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (ordering a
halt to the City's conversion of income support centers pending development of a cor-
rective plan to retrain staff). See generally Revamped Job Centers Questioned, 5 CITY L. 37
(Mar./Apr. 1999) (describing alleged problems with the new system of converting in-
take centers in response to the change in welfare rules).
68 For example, state and federal law require single parents of children under six
to participate in work activities for twenty hours per week, see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
335-b(3) (McKinney 2001), but New York City requires such individuals-together
with all other public assistance recipients-to perform thirty-five hours per week of
work. Hoover, supra note 61, at 132 n.6.
6. The 1996 Act requires states to ensure that a certain percentage of the adults
receiving federally supported assistance are "engaged in work." For these purposes,
"engaged in work" means participation in any of a number of activities, including cer-
tain educational and training activities, job search, community service and subsidized
employment. 42 U.S.C § 607(c)-(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
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government has allowed states to count such programs as "work" and
many counties in New York State do so.70 Further, New York City has
systematically pursued policies and practices that have foreclosed
higher education as a viable anti-poverty strategy for the vast majority
of welfare recipients.'
By 1997, New York City had the largest workfare program in the
country, with approximately 40,000 welfare recipients consigned to
menial workfare positions-sweeping streets, raking leaves, cleaning
toilets. From the City's perspective, the program worked brilliantly.
Workfare sanctions combined with other restrictive policies resulted
in the removal of hundreds of thousands of needy people from assis-
73
tance.
One of the many tragic consequences of the city's anti-welfareS 74
campaign, though certainly not the most dire, was that it forced
thousands of recipients who had been pursuing college degrees to
quit school in order to fulfill workfare requirements. A large per-
7o Compare, e.g., N.Y.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WELFARE TO WORK EMPLOYMENT
POLICY MANUAL, § 1300.9, at 9-21 (authorizing counties to include two-year college
programs as countable work activities), available at
http://www.labor.state.ny.us/html/wtw/emintro.htn, with N.Y.C. HUMAN RES.
ADMIN., FAMILY INDEP. ADMIN., POLICY DIRECTIVE No. 99-35RR (Mar. 22, 2000), at 17-
18 (imposing "12-month lifetime limit" on education and training).See CITY OF N.Y. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, INSIDE THE BUDGET, No. 72, at 4, fig.2-1
(Nov. 1, 2000) (reporting that as ofJune 2000, only 1.8% of adult welfare recipients in
New York City engaged in education or training as their work activity). See generally,
Ciarletta, supra note 64; David L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tension
Regarding the Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1997) ("Mayor Giuliani
advocates putting welfare recipients to work, even at the expense of education, because
working would restore a sense of dignity to those receiving public assistance.").
72 See David L. Gregory, Introduction to the Colloquium on the Welfare Workforce, 73 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) ("New York City has more welfare recipients engaged
in its workfare programs than any other city in the country."); Lawrence M. Mead, Is
Workfare Working? A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, 8J.L. & POL'Y 155, 156 (1999) ("The WEP Program with over 30,000 slots is
much larger than a public employment program that you might find in any other city
in the country. There is simply nothing like WEP anywhere in America.").See RonaldJ. Tabak, Is Workfare Working? A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York, 8J.L. & POL'Y 117, 118 (1999) (noting "questions
as to who is participating in workfare and the reasons why people have been removed
from welfare for not complying with welfare regulations").
74 For a partial description of the injuries inflicted by the City's policies, see FED'N
OF PROTESTANT WELFARE AGENCIES, INC., DOWNSIDE: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF
THE GIULIANI ADMINISTRATION'S WELFARE CASELOAD CUTS 4 (2000), available at
http://www.fpwa.org/publications/pov-welf.html.
See Shruti Rana, Restricting the Rights of Poor Mothers: An International Human
Rights Critique of "Workfare", 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 393, 435 (2000) ("While
Workfare programs are supposed to grant exemptions for education and promote
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centage of these individuals were single mothers struggling to obtain
the skills and educational credentials needed for ajob that could lift
their families out of poverty. Before welfare reform, 27,000 public as-
sistance recipients were working toward degrees in the CUNY system]
Within a year, the City had forced thousands of these students out of
college and into dead-end workfare positions.77
III. CASE STUDY: THE WELFARE RIGHTS INITIATIVE AND
THE CUNY LAW SCHOOL CLINIC
CUNY Law School viewed this situation as an especially compel-
ling case for intervention. We knew from academic studies that nearly
ninety percent of welfare recipients who earned CUNY degrees ob-
tained substantial, living-wage employment and exited the welfare sys-
tem permanently. By contrast, parents leaving welfare without higher
education tended to remain in poverty and cycle back onto 
relief,78
ahd those forced into workfare assignments almost never secured sus-
taining employment.' We also knew of the human stories behind the
statistics-inspiring stories of single mothers struggling against long
odds to make ends meet with inadequate funds, to provide decent
training, in practice the requirements are so harsh that many people are forced to
leave school.").
76 See Karen W. Arenson, Workfare Rules Cause Enrollment To Fall, CUNY Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1996, at Al ("At CUNY, which has more students on welfare than any
other college or university in the state, the number of those students has already
dropped 17 percent from 27,000 a year ago. About 22,000 of CUNY's 206,500 stu-
dents-more than 11 percent-are on welfare."); Wayne Barrett, Rudy's Milky Way,
VILLAGE VOICE (New York), Jan. 26, 1999, at 41, 45 (reporting that since 1995, "the
number of CUNY students on home relief has plummeted 86 percent, from 10,512 to
1459," and that since 1996, "CUNY ranks dropped 46.3 percent, from 17,108 to 8836").
77 See URBAN JUSTICE CTR., ORG. PROJECT, WELFARE, WORKFARE, AND JOBS: AN
EDUCATOR'S GUIDEBOOK I (1997) (estimating that workfare requirements had already
caused 9,000 students to leave CUNY).
78 See Marilyn Gittell et al., Building Human Capital: The Impact of Post-
Secondary Education on AFDC Recipients in Five States 1 (1993) (report to the Ford
Foundation, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (finding that "[a]s
with other college graduates, education enabled... [AFDC recipients in New York,
Tennessee, Washington, Wyoming, Illinois, and Pennsylvania] to find employment in
the primary labor market and become financially independent and secure").
SeeJeffrey B. Fannell, The National Labor Perspective of the AFL-CIO, 73 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 761, 764 (1999) (citing statistics that more poor people leave the welfare rolls
because of sanctions than because they have obtained employment); see also Liz
KRUEGER ET AL., WORKFARE: THE REAL DEAL II, at 6-17 (rev. ed. 1997) (noting that
fewer than five percent of workfare participants in New York City obtained regular
employment and the majority of those positions were low-skill jobs paying sub-poverty
wages).
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homes for their families, and to obtain the education that would en-
able them to escape poverty and dramatically alter the life chances of
their children. 0 Here, then, was a situation in which a modest com-
mitment of legal resources might enable large numbers of low-income
families to transform their lives in profound and enduring ways."
As powerfully as these circumstances motivated the law school to
act, we were even more strongly moved by the fact that welfare recipi-
ents themselves were already organizing and mobilizing around the
issue of higher education and its availability as a humane and effective
anti-poverty strategy. A new welfare rights organization-the Welfare
Rights Initiative-had sprung up at CUNY's Hunter College campus
and was spearheading the effort. The initial concept and design for
WRI originated in part from faculty at Hunter College, but leadership
and staff positions were soon occupied by women who were them-
selves current or former welfare recipients.
so See A]freda Lane et al., Working the Quadruple Day, 14 WOMENS' REV. BOOKs 19-
21 (1997) (interviewing four women who combined studying, working, or raising their
children with organizing and helping their fellow students to assert their rights). A
typical story was described in a recent WRI publication:
Lisa Cora enrolled in Bronx Community College the same week the welfare
department deemed her eligible for $147 every two weeks. Two years later,
Lisa is halfway to earning a Bachelor's degree at Hunter College, to be a
teacher, the goal she's had for nearly twenty years.
But recently Lisa has been under intense pressure from the Human Re-
sources Administration to quit school and return to low-paying employment.
"Unfortunately, each day in college could be my last," Lisa shrugs. She has
been ordered to add ten hours of workfare to her schedule.
The first page of Lisa's planner is a multi-color, coded week at a glance with
school photos pasted opposite the calendar page, of her 10 year old son smil-
ing shyly, and 7 year old daughter, all brown pensive eyes. Her days start at 6
AM. Blue slots indicate time to fix the kids three meals and green is time to
help each with their homework. These are interspersed with five college
classes, a 20-hour per week work-study job, and a day's worth of internship
hours. She allots less than 6 hours nightly for sleep, that's purple, and three
hours for homework, red.
Lisa is just managing. If not for the book bag on her stooped, shawl-clad
shoulders, this tiny, pale, twenty-six year old could be mistaken at first glance
for a woman twice her age.
Melinda K. Lackey, Welfare Rights Initiative: Promoting College Access 1 (Nov. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).81 On methods of case selection and deployment of legal services resources, see
generally Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God"." Triage Among Poor Clients,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999), in which the author argues that in a legal services
practice, "choosing among persons other than in a random way is a justified and nec-
essary endeavor." Id. at 2476.
2 Mimi Abramovitz, Professor of Social Work and Social Welfare Policy, andJanet
Poppendieck, Director of the Center for the Study of Family Policy, both noted experts
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From its inception, WRI set two broad goals for itself and has con-
tinued to pursue them. The first is immediate, issue-focused and in-
strumental: to help thousands of welfare recipients enrolled at CUNY
stay in school and to agitate for reforms that expand welfare recipi-
ents' access to higher education. In pursuit of this goal, WRI staff
provide direct counseling and advocacy for individual students; they
conduct know-your-rights sessions at many of the twenty CUNY cam-
puses to equip recipients to advocate for themselves and for others;
they train and support peer advocates; they engage in community and
campus organizing and mobilize low-income students and their sup-
porters for demonstrations, speak-outs and public testimony; and they
engage in legislative advocacy.
Many of these activities also advance WRI's second, more ambi-
tious goal, which is to open up and fundamentally alter the politics of
poverty and welfare. The aim is to democratize these politics, to inject
the voices of the poor into the poverty and welfare debate, to debunk• 83
the negative stereotypes that have driven public policy, and to em-
power poor people to influence public decisionmaking. WRI has pur-
sued this goal through an impressive community leadership program
that trains welfare recipients to act as organizers, public speakers, po-
litical activists, advocates and community leaders.
In 1997, the CUNY clinic entered into a partnership with WRI, in
part as a way of delivering legal services to students in need, but, more
fundamentally, because we believed that the collaboration would
in the field of social welfare policy, see generally MIMI ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING THE
LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(1996) (updating the story of women and social welfare to reflect current data, recent
trends, and the intensified assault on programs such as Social Security, unemployment
insurance, and AFDC); MIMI ABRAMOWITZ, UNDER ATTACK AND FIGHTING BACK:
WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (documenting the impact of re-
cent welfare reform policies on the lives of poor women and their children, and argu-
ing that welfare reform penalizes single motherhood and exposes poor women to the
risks of hunger, homelessness, and male violence), collaborated with Melinda Lackey
in the design and initial implementation of the WRI. Ms. Lackey serves as the organi-
zation's director. Cf ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
138 (1984) (observing that subordinated groups-even those with "indigenous re-
sources"-are often catalyzed into a movement or mobilized into action with the assis-
tance of exogenous activists, elites and institutions); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLES' MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 265
(Vintage Books 1979) (discussing the role of external intellectual resources in the wel-
fare rights movement of the 1960s and concluding that the movement arose "sponta-
neously" in most respects).
83 See, e.g., GANS, supra note 43, at 11-26 (discussing the pejorative myths and
stereotypes that academics and policymakers invented in the late 1960s to characterize
the poor).
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promote WRI's goals and magnify its impact as a grassroots social jus-
tice organization. 84 The design of the clinic and the structure of its re-
lationship with WRI reflect this broader goal. In essence, the clinic
serves as counsel to WRI and as its legal arm. The clinic provides legal
training and support for WRI's lay advocates, staff and counselors to
facilitate the organization's outreach and advocacy efforts. The clinic
offers WRI's staff and student activists priority access to legal represen-
tation in their own welfare cases, to provide a degree of security and
breathing space for the individuals whose assertiveness and activism
frequently bring them into conflict with welfare officials. The clinic
also lends technical and drafting skills to assist in the production of
public education materials and position papers, and clinic students
conduct joint community education and training sessions with WRI
staff.
At the heart of the collaboration, though, is the arrangement be-
tween WRI and the clinic for providing a high volume of targeted rep-
resentation to individual students. Both groups understood that if
WRI could reliably offer legal assistance to the students it sought to
mobilize, the organization would have acquired a potent organizing
tool. The clinic therefore agreed to place its entire case-handling ca-
pacity at WRI's disposal and committed, insofar as possible, to repre-
sent any student referred by WRI. Over the last few years this com-
mitment has meant representing nearly 500 individuals at
administrative hearings (most challenging proposed workfare sanc-
tions) and providing counseling or other assistance to a larger num-
ber of people. WRI refers to its relationship with the clinic as a "col-
laborative partnership," and to this joint legal effort as a "a model of
service provision as an organizing tool...." It explains the work as fol-
lows: "WRI's Supportive Services are provided through a unique col-
laborative partnership with CUNY Law School. Through an interdis-
ciplinary approach that incorporates law, social work, policy analysis,
84 The notion that poverty lawyers should strive to support and empower poor
peoples' organizations is, of course, not new, see, e.g., Wexler, supra note 20, at 1053,
and occupied a central place in Ed Sparer's thinking, see Sparer, supra note 21, at 86-88
("[T]he first step in a grand strategy for lawyers in advancing welfare rights is to serve,
and thereby help build, an independent rights movement.").
85 See CUNY Law School Makes a Diffrence, WRI UPDATE, Winter 2000-01, at 2, 2 (re-
porting that "[t]o date, 1,123 students have been able to stay in college, thanks to the
WRI/CUNY Law School collaborative that provides free legal services to students on
welfare. The law school reports a 100 percent success rate on decisions by administra-
tive law judges at fair hearings.").
86 Dillonna Lewis, Supportive Service for Social Change, WRI UPDATE, supra note 85,
at 1, 1-2.
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and community organizing, students on public assistance are gaining
the knowledge and skills needed for self and peer-representation at
administrative fair hearings."87
From the lawyer's perspective, this nontraditional "collaborative
lawyering" model came with its costs: most notably, it required the
clinic to sacrifice a great deal of control over its docket. But the
model has also brought significant advantages. As anticipated, it con-
tributed powerfully to WRI's organizing and mobilization campaigns,
s
and, incidentally, added sustaining layers of hope and meaning to the
clinic's poverty law practice.
In addition to serving as a resource for organizing and mobiliza-
tion, the WRI/CUNY collaboration has also had implications for a law
reform strategy. Because the clinic handles a high volume of adminis-
trative hearings relating to workfare, and represents more student wel-
fare recipients than any other law office in the city, it is able to discern
patterns and practices in the administration of the program that
might otherwise remain invisible, even if illegal or arbitrary. From this
vantage point, the clinic has shared insights, data, and evidence de-
87 Id. at 2.
88 WRI's use of legal representation as an organizing tool echoes a similar strategy
employed by welfare rights organizers three decades ago, and it raises some of the
same issues. In the 1960s, welfare rights organizations built membership by offering
legal assistance or other advocacy resources to poor families who became dues-paying
members. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 82, at 286-97 (discussing how welfare
rights organizations throughout the country relied primarily on solving the grievances
of existing recipients as an organizing strategy). The strategy proved to be quite effec-
tive, if only transitory, in expanding the ranks of these organizations and enhancing
their influence. Id. at 299. Some commentators have argued, however, that such
"conditional benefit" organizing strategies may be unduly coercive or inimical to indi-
vidual autonomy, at least in the context of welfare organizing. See, e.g., William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawtyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in
the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1109-10 (1994) (criticizing
the conditional benefit strategy as contrary to the "mainstream conception of advocacy
and that of the new poverty law scholarship"). WRI's organizing and mobilization
techniques, however, differ meaningfully from these earlier strategies. Unlike welfare
rights organizations of the 1960s, WRI offers its services without condition, and refers
cases to the clinic based solely on need. Admittedly, most students must interact with
WRI in order to access the clinic's legal resources, but WRI does not seek memberships
or pressure students to become activists. Whereas welfare rights organizations in the
1960s frequently relied on membership dues as a significant resource, the availability
of foundation funds and university resources mitigates this need for WRI. Once WRI
refers a student, the clinic establishes a wholly independent relationship with that indi-
vidual and provides representation without direction or interference from any third
party, and in accordance with the Code. See NEW YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILITY, Canon 5 (2001) ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judg-
ment on Behalf of a Client.").
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veloped at individual hearings with law offices throughout the city, to
assist in the design and prosecution of law-reform litigation and in the
enforcement of existing decrees. Thus, the large volume of targeted
representation, coupled with the benefits that Gary Bellow empha-
sized a generation ago in advocating what may be called a "focused
case pressure" strategy,89 magnified the clinic's impact beyond the sum
of the individual cases.
Lastly, WRI and the clinic pursued a more direct and explicit law
reform strategy. Two years ago, WRI convened a series of meetings
with staff, members, attorneys from the clinic and the Legal Aid Soci-
ety, and representatives of other community groups. The purpose was
to develop a state legislative agenda identifying potential reforms to
dismantle, or at least minimize, the barriers that have prevented so
many families from pursuing higher education as a path out of pov-
erty. Women with firsthand welfare expertise talked about their expe-
riences as college students at CUNY under pressure of the City's work-
fare requirements, and about the kind of practical changes that would
enable them to remain in school and complete their degrees. Partici-
pating lawyers from The Legal Aid Society of New York and from the
clinic translated these concerns into the technical language of a legis-
lative proposal.
WRI then launched an impressive campaign in support of the
proposed reforms. First, WRI staff mobilized CUNY students to edu-
cate them about the possible impact of the proposed legislative
changes and to organize pressure on state legislators. Next, WRI staff
organized public forums to rally support for the legislation. They co-
ordinated multiple trips to Albany to speak with legislators about the
proposed changes. They secured backing for the legislation from a
number of key organizations and officials around the state. Some of
these organizations were natural allies such as college presidents, fac-
ulty unions, social welfare agencies and advocacy groups. But WRI
won endorsements from less obvious quarters as well, convincing
business groups-such as the New York State Business Council and
the New York City Partnership-that they shared a set of structural
concerns with welfare mothers in college. ° With the assistance of lo-
cal politicians, WRI persuaded several key legislators, including the
89 See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106,118-19 (1977).
90 See Welfare Rights Initiative Report to the New York Community Trust 2 (Jan.
18, 2001) ("Key endorsements WRI secured included the New York Business Council,
The New York City Partnership, Calvin Butts and the Catholic Conference.").
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Republican chair of the New York State Senate Welfare Committee, to
attend a "Day at CUNY"-to meet with students on several campuses;
to hear stories of struggle and hardship directly from the women
whose lives and futures were most at stake and would be most im-
proved by the legislation; and to learn firsthand that the dominant
myths and stereotypes about welfare mothers do not fit the facts.
The lawyers reentered the picture when questions arose about the
legality of the proposed changes under federal law and other legal
implications of the amendments. The lawyers, in close consultation
with WRI, also negotiated specific legislative language with state offi-
cials. At this juncture, the danger that the legal professionals' exercise
of technical knowledge might overbear or disempower their commu-
nity-based partners presented itself .91 Understanding this dynamic,
and wishing to avoid it, the lawyers attempted to remain in a secon-
dary and facilitative role. ' 2 Others must judge whether these efforts
succeeded.
In the end, although the Legislature did not adopt WRI's entire
agenda, it did pass legislation that significantly expands welfare re-
cipients' access to higher education. The new law requires welfare
departments throughout the State to count work-study positions, in-
ternships and externships as "work activities" that can satisfy a college
student's workfare obligation. "3 The amendment also prohibits work-
fare assignments that unnecessarily interfere with the student's ability
to pursue a college degree.94
The Giuliani administration vigorously opposed the bill, even af-
ter it passed both houses of the Legislature by wide margins.9 But af-
ter additional organizing and political efforts by WRI, the governor
signed the measure into law on October 4, 2000."6 It took effect in
91 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REv. 485, 506-11 (1994) (criticizing the prevalence of a lawyer-
dominated approach to strategy and decision making that marginalizes and disem-
powers clients); Simon, supra note 89, at 1109-10 (arguing that the provision of any
professional advice--especially to perennially marginalized or subordinated groups-
constitutes an exercise of power).
92 Cf PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 82, at 285 (discussing efforts of organizers and
lawyers to limit their roles within welfare rights organizations by "subordinating them-
selves" to policy decisions made by organization members).
.13 The Work-Study and Internship Bill, 2000 N.Y. Laws 534.
94 Id.
95 See Workfare for Work-Study, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 7, 2000, at A]4 (re-
porting that Mayor Giuliani opposed the work-study legislation on the ground that it
would hamstring the city's efforts to pursue its welfare policy).
96 See Hunter Students Celebrate Legislative Success, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000, at B10
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December, just in time for the Spring 2001 semester. So now, in the-
ory at least, a CUNY undergraduate can satisfy her workfare require-
ment as a WRI intern fighting for progressive reforms to the city's
workfare policies.
I do not mean to suggest that these amendments to New York
State's welfare laws effected any fundamental or systemic social
change. Indeed, they simply reclaim some of the ground lost since
the "welfare reform" tragedy of 1996. But for many thousands of sin-
gle mothers struggling to earn their college degrees and escape pov-
erty, these changes may well make all the difference.!" And given the
political climate, it was truly remarkable that a grassroots organization
comprised largely of poor women won progressive reforms of any kind
in a state dominated by a Republican governor and a Republican Sen-
ate. Finally, beyond the instrumental import of WRI's campaign-the
legislative victory-the reform campaign itself proved to be exceed-
ingly valuable. The participants not only reaped the "expressive bene-
fits" of activism, they effectively contested existing social understand-
ings of poverty and welfare and altered, at least incrementally, the
tone, process and substance of the public discourse. "
IV. THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
AND THE NEW POVERTY LAW MOVEMENT
Edward Rubin's introductory Article to this Symposium invites
participants to "pass[] through the door" of legal scholarship to con-
sider how the literature of social movements might help us better ac-
count for the relation between law and social change.: Accepting that
invitation, this Part examines whether theories of social movement-
drawing from different methodologies and foundational premises-
might usefully contextualize or be illuminated by the interaction of law-
(noting that Governor Pataki signed legislation allowing work-study programs and in-
ternships to count as work activity for college students on workfare).
97 See Success and More Success, WRI UPDATE, supra note 85, at 2 (reporting that WRI
alumni are currently engaged in a broad range of activities, including: teaching kin-dergarten; serving as a Public Service Scholar at the New York City Council; earning aMasters in Divinity at the Union Theological Seminary; working as a journalist for theNew York Times, having earned a master's degree at the Columbia School ofJournalism;
running a construction company; and serving as coordinator of a food pantry).
98 See Hunter Students Celebrate Legislative Success, supra note 96, at B10, and accom-
panying text (describing the passage of reform legislation).
Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movements Literature and Legal
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1 (2001).
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yering, grassroots activism and law reform described above.'00
A. Social Movement Theories
The social movement literature offers no unified account of social
change or its relation to legal reform. Happily, Edward Rubin's Arti-
cle provides an accessible, if provocative, synthesis."" I offer here
merely a sketch of the three leading perspectives-the resource mobi-
lization theory, the new social movement theory, and the cognitive
praxis theory-with the hope that by simplifying the theories I do not
make them seem simplistic in approach.
1. Resource Mobilization
The theory of resource mobilization, considered the most "Ameri-
can" of approaches to social movements, 102 emerged in the last gen-
eration of the twentieth century. 0 3 It focuses on the ways in which "an
opposition assembles resources for challenging the incumbents"
4
and examines "the conditions that enable movement organizations to
100 Ed Rubin does not define such concepts as law reform, social movement, or
mobilization. Id. at 3. In a similar spirit, I assume that the WRI collaboration with the
CUNY Law School clinic is part of a process of social mobilization and social change,
however defined. Cf SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 2 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that a social movement refers to
"those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks
and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sus-
tained challenges against powerful opponents"); Alain Touraine, An Introduction to the
Study of Social Movements, 52 SOC. RES. 749, 750, 760 (1985) (stating that "[t]here is an
almost general agreement that social movements should be conceived as a special type
of social conflict," but reserving "the concept 'social movements' only to refer to con-
flicts around the social control of the main cultural patterns").
WI Rubin, supra note 99.
102 ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 193-94 Uohn Keane & Paul Mier eds.,
1989) ("Resource mobilization is... an American phenomenon .... ); Bert Klander-
mans & Sidney Tarrow, Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing European and
American Approaches, in 1 INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 1, 2-3 (1988) (discussing resource
mobilization theory and explaining that by contrast to Continental theorists, "Ameri-
cans developed their research mainly at the group and individual level, looking sys-
tematically at the groups that organized mass protest, at their forms of action, and at
the motivations of individuals who joined them").
103 See WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST 148 (2d ed. 1990)
(explaining that the resource mobilization theory emerged around 1975). Early lead-
ing texts discussing the resource mobilization approach include: CHARLES TILLY,
FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978); andJohn D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald,
Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM.J. SOC. 1212 (1977).
104 ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 28 (1973).
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gather together the political resources necessary to mount an effective
protest."'0 5 Resource mobilization theorists discount efforts to explain
social mobilization as the spontaneous reaction of aggrieved masses
against an oppressive society. As "grievances are ubiquitous in a soci-
ety," they argue, "grievances alone cannot be sufficient conditions for
the rise of social movements. The availability of resources and oppor-
tunities for collection action were considered more important ... in
triggering social movement formation." 00 In seeking to explain why
individuals choose to join social movements, resource mobilization
theorists emphasize the free rider problem in collective action, and
the role that special incentives play in attracting individuals to partici-
pate. 1 7 Commentators have applied resource mobilization theory to
study the ways in which marginalized groups assemble necessary re-
sources to obtain political rights or social status." 8
2. The New Social Movements
The theory of new social movements draws from Continental the-
ory and views social mobilization ideologically, as a rejection of con-
ventional participatory institutions and hegemonic regimes. Social
movements, by these lights, aim "to politicize the institutions of civil
society in ways that are not constrained by the channels of representa-
tive-bureaucratic political institutions. "'09 These new social move-
ments seek, as Claus Offe explains, "to reconstitute a civil society that is
no longer dependent upon ever more regulation, control, and inter-
105 THOMAS R. ROCHON, MOBILIZING FOR PEACE: THE ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENTS
IN WESTERN EUROPE 18 (1988).
106 Klandermans & Tarrow, supra note 102, at 4 (citations omitted).
107 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); see GAMSON, supra
note 103, at 151-54 (defining a selective incentive as "some tangible good or service
that an organization provides its members as an inducement to participate");
HANDLER, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing social reform groups in terms of overcoming
free rider problems and the provision of selective incentives); GERALD MARWELL &
PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY
3-9 (1993) (discussing Olson's treatise and its impact on collective action theories).
108 See ROCHON, supra note 105, at 19 & n.26 (providing examples). Responding
to Continental trends, resource mobilization theorists have more recently begun to
focus on "how issues are framed and how challengers can reframe them." GAMSON,
supra note 103, at 149 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, they tend to ignore "the way
in which collective identity is created and transformed" in the process of resource mo-
bilization. Id. at 148.
109 Claus Offe, New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Poli-
tics, 52 Soc. RES. 817, 820 (1985).
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vention."" Social movements, as Alain Touraine says, are not "pe-
ripheral phenomen[a] of deviation," but rather "the fabric of social
life," with opposition efforts constitutive of a new form of living that is
autonomous and not subject to hegemonic control."' Participants in
the new social movements frequently have been characterized as the
"relatively privileged," who mobilize "on the basis of nonmaterial is-
sues.
3. Cognitive Praxis
The theory of cognitive praxis views social mobilizations as an as-
pect of a social theory of knowledge, processes that enable partici-
pants to forge new identities, and that serve "as temporary public
spaces, as moments of collective creation that provide societies with
ideas, identities, and even ideals.""3 The cognitive praxis approach
regards social knowledge as collectively built, as "the product of a se-
ries of social encounters," in which the experiences of the mobilized,
the movement, and the opponent, relate and change in ongoing
"processes in formation."" 4 Social movements are thus social con-
structions, constituting the actors' "movable definition of themselves
and their social world, a more or less shared and dynamic understand-
ing of the goals of their action as well as the social field of possibilities
and limits within which their action takes 
place."" 5
B. The Case Study Re-examined
The WRI/CUNY collaboration offers an opportunity to explore
the explanatory force of these competing social movement theories in
a concrete, if localized, context.
1. Resource Mobilization
The emergence of the WRI/CUNY collaboration and the grass-
Id.
ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 94-95 (Alan Duff trans., 1981).
112 RoCHON, supra note 105, at 16-17.
113 RON EERMAN & ANDREW JAMISON, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A COGNITIVE
APPROACH 4 (1991).
114 Id. at 57-59.
115 John Keane & Paul Mier, Preface to NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 4 Uohn Keane & Paul
Mier eds., 1989).
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roots mobilization that resulted might plausibly be explained by re-
source mobilization theory. First, WRI constituted itself at a public
university, drawing on the intellectual and material resources of an es-
tablished academic center. Likewise, the CUNY School of Law com-
mitted additional resources and consciously deployed them in ways
that would maximize support for WRI and strengthen its organizing,
advocacy and community empowerment efforts. Moreover, WRI's
ability to offer legal services might be regarded as a use of selective in-
centives to overcome collective action problems that could have been
a barrier to group activity. Much like the strategy employed by welfare
rights organizers in the 1960s (where the offer of help resolving griev-
ances or securing special grants brought thousands of recipients at
least temporarily into the movement), WRI's ability to offer legal assis-
tance has drawn large numbers of students from across New York City
into contact with the organization. While WRI does not pressure any-
one to join or to participate in organizing or advocacy efforts, many of
the students who receive representation or other services maintain
contact with WRI, respond to mobilization calls, advocate for fellow
students, and, in some cases, become allied activists on their own
campuses.
Just as importantly, the sheer volume of welfare recipients that
have turned to and been served by the collaboration has provided
WRI with important capital-a strong claim of expertise and a recog-
nized status as an authentic voice and representative of the thousands
of welfare recipients enrolled at CUNY. So, too, WRI's affiliation with
a law office, as well as a university, seems to have enhanced its per-
ceived status and legitimacy. These endowment effects may have en-
hanced WRI's perceived status and legitimacy and positioned it to
demand reform from policymakers outside its grassroots circle.
2. The New Social Movements
Viewing the WRI/CUNY collaborative partnership through the
lens of new social movement theory shifts the focus to the project's
ideological meaning, as expressed in its challenge to many of the
"hegemonic constraints" and prevailing assumptions of post-
industrial, post-modern society."" WRI's organizing, mobilizing and
It See Susan Harding, Reconstructing Order Through Action: Jim Crow and the Southern
Civil Rights Movement, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 378, 379-80 (Charles
Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984) (discussing social movements as modes of chal-
lenging "hegemonic world views" and "prevailing understandings that define .. social
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public education campaigns very explicitly aim to displace the domi-
nant stereotypes and belief systems through which society justifies the
conventional roles it assigns to individuals. Indeed, the very possibility
of single mothers succeeding as college students in a public university
while receiving welfare threatens deeply held assumptions of a politi-
cal and economic system that ordinarily consigns such individuals,
along with other selected groups, to a marginalized and often reviled
underclass. The specter of welfare mothers acting as effective com-
munity leaders and public speakers, and collaborating in joint ven-
tures with attorneys and law students, delivers a similar threat. That
an organization of poor women mounted a sophisticated and success-
ful campaign for legislative reform presses the ideological challenge
more deeply. Moreover, the social activism WRI facilitated generated
many of the "self-realization" effects associated with new social move-
ments. Having claimed a successful role in the process of social value
and public policy formation, the WRI activists-by their own report-
began to imagine themselves differently and to articulate and assume
an empowered collective identity born of their collective action."
'
3. Cognitive Praxis
Finally, the theory of cognitive praxis invites recognition of the
cognitive capital that WRI, through its lay leaders and collective par-
ticipants, creates and cultivates. Although some commentators de-
scribe litigation processes as socially debilitating and politically ener-
vating, student participation in the administrative hearing process has
generated certain cognitive and political advantages. As WRI ex-
plains,
WRI and the law students do not solve students' cases for them. Rather
they work to assist students to connect with their own sources of
strength, to realize their personal capacity to solve their cases, help oth-
ers and even join together to influence ... just programs and policy. '
identity").
117 See Bert Klandermans, Social Movement Organizations and the Movement Research,
in 2 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH 8 (Bert Klandermans ed., 1989)
(describing new social movements as creating "democratic niches in society in which
autonomous social action creates new identities" for movement adherents apart from a
.general social identity whose interpretation they contest").
118 Lewis, supra note 86, at 2. In this respect, the theory of the WRI/clinic collabo-
rative resonates with Gary Bellow's "focused case pressure strategy," a technique
through which poverty lawyers concentrate representation on a particular landlord,
welfare center or other institution, and, in the process, connect clients encountering
similar problems and encourage them to view those problems systematically and re-
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In the process, WRI reports, "[s] tudents are together realizing the po-
litical nature of problems they once perceived as uniquely personal.""l'9
Both the resource mobilization and the new social movement's
approaches ignore the cognitive contribution that WRI's mobilizing
activities make to law reform efforts. The legislative agenda WRI de-
veloped did not proceed as a menu of options, preordained and des-
ignated by the lawyers, but rather emerged from the actual, experien-
tial concerns of the individuals affected by the offending policies. The
resource mobilization approach assumes that social movements draw
resources from exogenous sources-from legislatures, lawyers, and la-
bor markets; the cognitive approach recognizes that social movements
provide resources from endogenous sources, adding to intellectual
capital and changing existing discourses. WRI puts it nicely in one of
its public fliers: "WRI is tapping the resource represented by 10,000
CUNY students who are themselves claimants of public assistance.' 20
This resource, the experiential base of those affected by regulation, is
otherwise too often ignored, silenced, and rendered illegitimate.
Do these theories, together, contribute to the understanding of
how social movements contribute to, or facilitate, law reform? What
lessons might one draw from the collaborative partnership that the
case study describes? WRI's work with the clinic does not suggest easy
generalization, in part because of its idiosyncratic nature. The col-
laboration involves activists and lawyers working within a progressive
university community,1 2' the fact that CUNY students occupy both
spond collectively. See Bellow, supra note 89, at 119-22. Social movement theorists re-
fer to this sort of intervention as "defining and interpreting grievances" and describe it
as a function of social movements. See Klandermans, supra note 117, at 9 ("One's in-
terpretations, rather than the reality itself, guide political actions.... According to
scholars who emphasize grievance interpretation, the crucial variables in movement
mobilization are not anger or frustration, but the belief that one's interests are com-
mon interests, as well as the perception of injustice-that is, the belief that these inter-
ests are legitimate ...."); cf White, supra note 7, at 539-40 ("Litigation provides a set-
ting-a set of experiences-which might enable poor people to become more
politically effective in their own lives.").
H9 Lewis, supra note 86, at 2.
120 Welfare Rights Initiative (n.d.) (unpublished program literature, on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
The City University of New York, the largest urban public university in the
United States, dates back to the founding of the Free Academy in 1847. From its in-
ception, the University's mission has been to open the halls of higher education to the
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places in the lawyer-client relationship contributes to feelings of
trust,122 and the clinic has more flexibility than the traditional legal
services office to redeploy resources and to alter structures in order to
adapt to the constituencies' perceived sense of need and strategy.
These factors help produce complex synergies between activists work-
ing for social change and lawyers seeking law reform, confirming that
law reform-even in the narrow sense-serves both as goal and as
means for further social movement and, conversely, that grassroots
mobilization likewise has value as both an end in itself and as a means
for achieving immediate issue-specific reforms.
The clinic could not have operated very successfully (and may not
have come into existence at all) but for the emergence of a grassroots
welfare rights organization. The alliance we formed in turn assisted
WRI's organizing and mobilization efforts and helped WRI establish
itself-in the eyes of recipients, the advocacy community, other insti-
tutions and public officials-as credible experts and the legitimate
voice for this population and this issue. That standing, coupled with
access to legal expertise and the ability to mobilize large numbers of
people, figured heavily in WRI's ability to secure legal reforms
through amendments to state law. The legislative victory has, in turn,
given rise to new opportunities for rights education and enforcement,
provided a new focus for organizing, enhanced the standing of WRI
even further, and positioned it to expand its base of support to pursue
new reforms. 1 3 If these experiences teach any lesson, that lesson em-
diverse populations of New York City, including low-income individuals. Founded in
1983, CUNY School of Law defines its mission as "training law students for public serv-
ice" and advancing social justice. CUNY SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN 6 (2001).
122 Students at CUNY Law School reflect diversities not typical of the legal profes-
sion itself. See id. at 26 ("[O]ver 60% of [CUNY] students are women and more than
one-third are people of color. They speak more than twenty foreign languages and are
members of over forty ethnic groups. The age range of the class of 2002 is from 20
years to 66 years with an average age of 29 years."). Many clinic students have them-
selves experienced poverty and welfare, creating at least the possibility for unique lev-
els of empathy, trust and understanding with clinic clients.
123 See Stephanie Flanders, When a Day's Work Still Doesn't Count: Job Rules for Stu-
dents on Welfare Continue 7"o Cause Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2001, at B3 (discuss-
ing effects of legislation that liberalized workfare rules and commenting on possible
further reforms). Last year, WRI and the clinic joined with a number of advocacy
groups and grassroots organizations to form a new city-wide coalition, the Coalition for
Access to Training and Education (CATE). After many months of legal, organizational
and political work, CATE recently secured introduction of a bill in the New York City
Council that, if adopted, would dramatically expand welfare recipients' access to col-
lege and other forms of education and training as paths out of poverty. See N.Y. City
Council, Bill Int. No. 959 (2001); Diane Cardwell, Manhattan: Welfare-Rights Bill, N.Y.
TIMES,July 27, 2001, at B5 (describing the purpose of the proposed legislation).
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phasizes the need to be sensitive to localized contexts and the details
of everyday relations.
CONCLUSION
This Article joins a broader conversation that seeks, in part, to sur-
face questions about the interaction between social activism and law
reform. Although there may be no body of literature that fully ex-
plores the connection between social mobilization and the process of
legal change, at least some scholars and some activists have been at-
tentive to this relationship. Ed Sparer, in whose memory this Sympo-
sium convenes, was one such scholar-activist. Unconsciously we may
think of social movements only as grand and visible-as powerful
surges of creative energy aimed at fundamental social change and le-
gal reform. But we should not lose sight of the smaller, less visible
struggles that contribute in unexplained ways to a more humane soci-
ety. As Sparer reminds us, "[t]oo many persons, including a large
percentage of welfare lawyers, do not understand that large forward
movements are possible only as the expectations of people increase as
a result of numerous small struggles, reforms, and increased under-
standing.",1
4
24 Sparer, supra note 21, at 91.
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